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ANALYSIS
Benefit Sharing Arrangements in the Russian North and Alaska
Maria Tysiachniouk (Centre for Independent Social Research, St. Petersburg, Russia and Environmental Policy 
Group at Wageningen University, Netherlands)
Abstract
As part of a recent study, we investigated benefit sharing arrangements between oil companies and indige-
nous communities in several regions of Russia—the Nenets Autonomous Okrug [NAO], Khanti-Mansiiski 
Autonomous Okrug (KhMAO), Sakhalin—and on the North Slope of Alaska—Barrow, Nuiqsut, Kaktovik. 
Our analysis demonstrates that indigenous communities are not benefitting equally from oil and gas extrac-
tion. The project analysed the procedural and distributional equity of four different types of benefit sharing 
arrangements: paternalism, corporate social responsibility, partnership and shareholder models.
Costs and Benefits
Oil extraction in remote territories of the Russian North 
and Alaska brings opportunities for development to remote 
areas, as well as costs to local communities and indigenous 
peoples, affecting their subsistence way of life and making 
land unavailable for traditional resource use. In many cases, 
it is apparent that the costs of resource extraction to local 
communities outweigh the benefits. Most transnational 
corporations working in the Arctic oil and gas sector have 
declared their commitment to benefit-sharing arrangements 
that assist indigenous communities and protect indigenous 
rights to land and access to traditional resources, but the 
local implementation of these commitments varies.
Ideally, benefit sharing represents a more stringent 
notion of social equity than corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR), since it claims to reduce the gap between local 
resource providers and global beneficiaries (Schroeder, 
2007). Differences in benefit sharing arrangements 
depend upon legislation, local and regional contexts and 
the level of empowerment of indigenous communities. 
Benefits from oil extraction can be shared by oil companies 
with local communities in a number of ways: taxes, devel-
opment of infrastructure, local employment, and through 
less formal negotiated benefits, such as sponsorship, com-
pensation for damage, oil dividends, and socioeconomic 
agreements, among others. Ideally, the concept of benefit 
sharing has to incorporate both procedural and distribu-
tional justice that goes beyond compensations for loss.
Our recent literature review has identified four models 
of benefit-sharing arrangements, including paternalism, 
CSR, partnership and shareholder types (Tysiachniouk 
2016). This study is based on qualitative research meth-
odologies, including semi-structured interviews, par-
ticipant observation and document analysis. Interviews 
were conducted with more than 190 oil industry rep-
resentatives, members of indigenous peoples’ organiza-
tions, NGO experts, representatives of regional and local 
authorities, and local residents between 2011 and 2016.
Field research showed that there are mixed types of 
benefit sharing arrangements in both the Russian North 
and Alaska, resulting in different outcomes for local 
communities and indigenous peoples. In each region, 
benefit sharing arrangements were assessed from the per-
spective of procedural and distributional equity.
To assess the fairness of benefit sharing arrange-
ments, we make use of the concept of equity devel-
oped by McDermott et al (2013). They make a distinc-
tion between procedural and distributive dimensions of 
equity. Procedural equity refers to participation in deci-
sion-making processes—for example, who is involved in 
the design of benefit sharing arrangements and to what 
extent can indigenous people participate in them? Dis-
tributive equity encompasses the distribution of mone-
tary and non-monetary benefits that indigenous people 
receive from oil production. The articles in this issue 
of the Russian Analytical Digest analyze benefit shar-
ing arrangements observed in the Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug (NAO), Khanti-Mansiiski Autonomous Okrug 
(KhMAO), Sakhalin, Komi Republic, and the North 
Slope of Alaska (Barrow, Nuiqsut, Kaktovik).
Major Modes of Benefit Sharing 
Arrangements
There are four types of benefit-sharing arrangements. 
Each is described briefly below.
Paternalistic mode: The state is dominant in this 
mode and it monitors and intervenes in companies’ cor-
porate social responsibility efforts. The company adds 
to or replaces the state’s efforts to provide support to 
local communities and indigenous peoples, who do 
not, or only poorly control, the delivery of benefits. In 
Russia, the paternalistic mode is rooted in the linger-
ing effects of the Soviet past and often results in the 
indigenous people’s dependency on the oil companies. 
Therefore, in some areas, there has been a transition 
from state paternalism to corporate paternalism. In 
Alaska, paternalism is perceived by both scholars and 
indigenous people as rooted in colonialism. Here we 
show how this system works in the Nenets Autono-
mous Okrug.
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mode: The 
oil company network is dominant in this mode. The 
company adopts globally developed standards coming 
from such sources as the International Labor Organ-
ization (ILO) convention, United Nations guidelines, 
the Arctic Council guidelines, standards of the Euro-
pean Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
World Bank, and International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). Companies pursuing benefit-sharing arrange-
ments take into account both global standards and local 
path-dependent practices in a minimalistic way. This 
mode of benefit sharing arrangements was observed in 
several Russian regions: Komi Republic, Khanti-Man-
siiski Autonomous Okrug and Irkutskaya oblast. This 
paper illustrates the CSR mode in the example of the 
Khanti-Mansiiski Autonomous okrug.
Partnership mode: This type of benefit sharing takes 
the form of tripartite partnerships among the oil com-
panies, government and indigenous communities. The 
partnership mode fosters development, empowerment, 
self-sufficiency and participatory decision-making in 
the indigenous communities. This mode was studied 
on Sakhalin Island.
Shareholder mode: The shareholder approach pro-
vides residents with dividend funds and shares from 
regional and village corporations. This mode has been 
investigated in the North Slope of Alaska.
Empirical Findings
Nenets Autonomous Okrug
The paternalistic mode of benefit sharing arrangements 
has been observed predominantly in the Nenets Autono-
mous okrug (NAO) in 2011–2012 (Henry et al. 2016). In 
the framework of socio-economic agreements between 
oil companies and the governor, oil money was chan-
neled to indigenous communities through state-led pro-
grams and was spent without input from the indigenous 
people. These practices resulted in housing provided to 
indigenous reindeer herders that was not adapted to per-
mafrost conditions, loss of money during construction 
projects, and a variety of other problems.
Direct socio-economic agreements between oil com-
panies and indigenous enterprises until 2013 involved 
mostly in-kind support as oil companies did not trust 
indigenous people to manage their bank accounts and 
the amount of money was dependent on reindeer herd-
ers’ negotiation skills. When money was transferred into 
bank accounts, indigenous enterprises were obliged to 
submit reports on their spending.
Since 2013, these agreements have been replaced 
with formal compensation for damage to the pasture 
lands calculated according to a  federally developed 
methodology. As a result, the amount of money chan-
neled to indigenous peoples increased 5–10 times. Even 
though both the socio-economic agreements and com-
pensation were negotiated directly between indigenous 
leaders and oil companies, the participatory equity of 
the reindeer herders has remained low.
Nevertheless, the distributional equity increased 
with the switch from socio-economic agreements to 
compensation. The level of paternalism toward indige-
nous peoples in NAO in 2015–2016 decreased both 
because of the economic downturn and the inability of 
the state and companies to deliver goods and services to 
indigenous communities, and because reindeer herding 
enterprises became more mature, self sufficient and inde-
pendent compared to the early post-soviet years. In this 
region, the paternalistic mode of benefit sharing grad-
ually transferred towards CSR mode.
Khanti-Mansiiski Autonomous Okrug 
(KhMAO)
As part of their CSR, companies conclude annual socio-
economic cooperation agreements with the governor of 
KhMAO and municipalities. These deals include con-
structing social infrastructure in towns and villages, 
such as schools, kindergartens, recreation centers, road 
construction etc. If indigenous people have officially des-
ignated territories for traditional use of natural resources 
(TTNR), “typical agreements” are made directly with 
households. They provide the same goods to all house-
holds, without taking into account to what extent TTNR 
is damaged by the oil infrastructure and drilling. There-
fore, the distributional equity is very low in KhMAO. 
Heavily and lightly affected households receive the same 
number of snowmobiles, outboard motors, motor saws, 
fuel, and clothing. If local residents have no formally 
designated TTRNs, the company transfers funds to 
the budget of the district administration, which then 
distributes the received funds, as in Beloyarski district. 
Here, state paternalism is strong. The company allots 
a certain sum to the local administration that distrib-
utes it after engaging in only a few consultations with 
the locals. The amount of material aid and the procedure 
of distribution are non-transparent.
Several indigenous people in KhMAO are elected 
to the State Duma, where a special commission for dis-
pute resolution between oil companies and indigenous 
people has been set up. Indigenous people are active and 
may oppose oil expansion, as in Numto Nature Park, 
for example. Generally, while the participation rate of 
indigenous people in disputing oil development is high 
and citizens rebel against state and company paternal-
ism, the participatory equity in benefit sharing agree-
ments remains low. Therefore, both distributional and 
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participatory equity in KMAO are recommended to 
be improved.
Sakhalin Island
The partnership mode of benefit sharing arrangements 
was observed in the oil companies/operators of the two 
large transnational consortia: Sakhalin Energy and 
Exxon Neftegaz Limited on Sahkalin Island. There, the 
success of benefit sharing practices depends upon the cor-
porate policy of the consortium operator and on whether 
loans from investment banks are received. Sakhalin 
Energy, through loans and investments, was profoundly 
influenced by the global rules of international financial 
institutions related to the environment and indigenous 
people. The consortium adopted a multitude of global 
standards, including free prior and informed consent, 
and became subject to annual third party evaluations 
(Wilson, 2016). The Indigenous Minorities Development 
Plan that evolved under the influence of the International 
Finance Corporation and the World Bank, incorporat-
ing the full range of global sustainability standards, was 
relatively complex and was available to all districts pop-
ulated by indigenous people. It included the participa-
tion of indigenous people in distributing grant fund-
ing to community groups. Although this approach was 
popular, it also generated some conflict among commu-
nity members around the distribution of funds. In con-
trast, Exxon Neftegaz Limited depended less on loans 
and was not significantly influenced by international 
financial institutions. The benefit sharing arrangement is 
less complex and more flexible, including grant funding 
available to communities where drilling occurs, but not 
for other communities. It has been less prone to conflict 
than benefit sharing by Sakhalin Energy. Tripartite part-
nership benefit sharing arrangements adopted by both 
consortium operators proved to be high in both par-
ticipatory and distributional equity. As we will see (see 
Tulaeva, Tysiachniouk in this RAD issue), only consor-
tium operators on Sakhalin Island explored the partner-
ship mode of benefit sharing arrangements, while Rus-
sian companies proceeded with paternalism.
North Slope of Alaska
Benefit sharing arrangements in Alaska are extremely 
complicated and involve several layers of governance. In 
Alaska, every resident annually receives Permanent Fund 
Dividends. Indigenous people of the North Slope are 
almost always shareholders of the Arctic Slope Regional 
Corporation (ARSC) and usually of one of the village 
corporations and receive dividends from both. ASRC 
contracts with many oil companies and receives royalties 
from oil extraction on native-owned land. The village 
corporation for the community of Nuiqsut (Kuukpik 
Corporation), for example, is very successful, owns the 
surface title to the land, receives royalties through sur-
face-use agreements with industry and with ASRC, is 
involved in oil-field services and benefits from contracts 
with oil company ConocoPhillips. This results in signif-
icant dividends from Kuupik to its shareholders, while 
dividends from less successful village corporations may 
be much lower. ConocoPhillips provides additional sup-
port to the Nuiqsut, including free natural gas for the 
community, scholarships to students and sponsorship 
of events, and contributes to community infrastruc-
ture. For unavoidable impacts to subsistence and culture, 
mitigation money is provided through the Northeast-
ern NPR-A Regional Mitigation Strategy. In addition, 
multiple benefits come to indigenous people through the 
State of Alaska and the North Slope Borough, both of 
which receive taxes from oil infrastructure. The North 
Slope Borough is the largest employer, has its own hos-
pitals and police, builds houses for indigenous families, 
and funds schools.
However, there are multiple conflicts and tensions 
in communities around benefit sharing and distribu-
tion of funds, participatory equity is high, while distri-
butional equity is low. Tensions emerge between the city, 
tribal government and Kuupik Corporation in Nuiq-
sut around distribution of funds as these three govern-
ance entities have different interests. Tribal governments 
are not benefitting from oil, are more environmentally 
oriented, and are often not in favor of future oil devel-
opment. The city government is usually neutral or pro-
development, while Kuupik Corporation is pro-devel-
opment. Therefore, difficulties occur in decision making 
around mitigation funds.
Another set of tensions occur between those who 
are born before 1971 and younger “afterborn” people 
in Nuiqsut. ASRC and several village corporations give 
fewer rights to “afterborns,” but still provide shares, 
while the Kuupik Corporation distributes dividends 
only for those born before 1971 or who have inher-
ited shares. Tensions continue within indigenous fam-
ilies around gifted and inherited shares. Despite ten-
sions it is important to acknowledge that income from 
oil extraction is shared between companies and indige-
nous communities and indigenous peoples have broad 
opportunities for economic development. The relation-
ships between the North Slope Borough and indige-
nous communities remain paternalistic as Inupiat people 
expect multiple benefits, such as medical care, housing 
and infrastructure. With Conoco-Phillips the relation-
ships fluctuate between the CSR and partnership modes, 
while the shareholder mode experiences multiple pitfalls 
due to the lack of distributional equity and overall con-
flictual environment.
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Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This article demonstrates that indigenous people in all 
research sites become dependent on oil money and expe-
rience significant impacts from oil extraction on their 
subsistence lifestyle and culture. The benefits from oil 
extraction are highly variable.
The articles collected in this issue contribute to policy 
development for benefit sharing in the Arctic. We urge 
the Arctic Council Sustainable Development Work-
ing Group to conduct a study with the aim of finding 
the best practices, reproduction of lessons learned, and 
development of guidelines for companies on benefit-
sharing arrangements. Further development of benefit 
sharing policies for the Arctic regions is essential.
It is important that the extractive industries share 
a portion derived from the resources they extract with 
native inhabitants in an equitable way. Ideally, the con-
cept of benefit sharing should incorporate both pro-
cedural and distributional justice that goes beyond sim-
ple compensation for loss.
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ANALYSIS
Participation in Benefit-Sharing Arrangements in the Komi Republic
Minna Pappila (University of Lapland), Soili Nysten-Haarala (University of Turku), and Ekaterina Britcyna 
(University of Lapland)
Abstract
The oil industry is vital for the economy of the Komi Republic in Russia. It also benefits the municipalities 
near oil production sites in terms of benefit-sharing agreements between oil companies and local author-
ities. These agreements compose an important part of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of oil com-
panies working in the Komi Republic, and in Russia in general. While this financial support is essential for 
local communities, local people also primarily bear the negative environmental impacts of oil operations. 
Yet, they rarely have a chance to participate either in environmental decision-making or in formulating ben-
efit-sharing agreements. This paper discusses why this is problematic, and demonstrates new developments 
in Russian CSR practices: in 2015, the oil company Lukoil-Komi concluded a new type of benefit-sharing 
agreement with the indigenous peoples’ association Izvatas. In addition to traditional social benefits, the 
company agreed to consult the communities on new projects and committed to disclose information about 
oil leaks publicly. This more recent type of benefit-sharing arrangement incorporates elements of local par-
ticipation in environmental issues into the prevailing form of philanthropic and paternalistic CSR practices.
Izhemskii District
The local economy of Izhemskii district and other oil-
producing areas in the Komi Republic depend on extrac-
tive industries. As an unfortunate side-effect, the district 
has long suffered from oil leaks and the resulting neg-
ative environmental impacts. Old and rusty pipelines 
and wells continuously cause new oil leaks and are the 
major factor leading to the destruction of the vulnera-
ble ecosystems in the Komi Republic. Some of the oil 
pipelines have not been replaced since the Soviet era 
(Wilson 2015, Pierk & Tysiachniouk 2016, Britcyna et 
al. forthcoming).
Our case study area, Izhemskii district, is in the 
northern part of the Komi Republic. The local pop-
ulation consists predominantly of the Komi-Izhemtsi, 
a part of whom still practice reindeer herding and fish-
ing, and have their own distinct dialect and culture. 
They are a subgroup of Komis, and have tried to obtain 
official status from the Russian Federation as an indige-
nous people—as descendants of reindeer herders, who 
partly still engage in their traditional way of life—but 
without success (Pierk &Tysiachniouk 2016).
The oil companies in the region have their corporate 
social responsibility policies and practices, yet the local 
people do not seem to be satisfied with them, and con-
flicts keep arising due to environmental problems. The 
relationship between oil companies and local commu-
nities dates back to the Soviet regime, when enterprises 
were state units and, as such, provided social services 
(Kortelainen & Nysten-Haarala 2009). Nowadays, the 
companies are continuing some of these practices in the 
form of benefit-sharing agreements, which are an impor-
tant part of CSR practices among the Russian oil com-
panies (Henry et al 2016).
In our paper, we examine how Russian environ-
mental impact assessment (EIA) legislation and CRS 
practices support citizen participation and environ-
mental responsibility, which have become an  impor-
tant part of CSR globally. In our case study we com-
bined the methods of legal studies and sociology. We 
studied how legislation is being implemented in local-
ities and what measures oil enterprises take to either 
enhance or hinder the participation of local people in 
decision-making processes. The case study highlights 
how interaction among different stakeholders func-
tions in a Russian locality (Britcyna et al. forthcom-
ing). In 2015, we made two field trips, one to Izhemskii 
district to interview the representatives of local gov-
ernments and oil companies, as well as activists, and 
another one to Moscow to interview representatives 
of companies. In total, we conducted 42 semi-struc-
tural interviews.
Several oil companies operate in the Republic of 
Komi, among them are LUKOIL-Komi (hereinafter 
Lukoil-Komi), Rosneft, Kolvaneft, Yenisei, Pechoranef-
tegaz, and Neftus. We focus on the relations between 
Lukoil-Komi and local communities, because Lukoil-
Komi is the largest oil producer of the Northwest Rus-
sia, with more than 60 oil fields in the Komi Republic 
and Nenets Autonomous Area (Lukoil 2015).
Local People and their Relationship with 
the Company in Izhma
Local residents feel the effects of oil extraction, leading 
many to criticize the current practices of oil companies. 
The communities complain about polluted lakes and 
rivers with poisoned fish, and report that swamps, rein-
deer pastures and forest areas are contaminated with oil 
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mud. Contamination of the environment leads to the 
degradation of the traditional way of life for the locals.1
Dead reindeer and poisoned berries and mushrooms 
in the forests and swamps have increased tensions among 
the locals, sparking numerous protests and demonstra-
tions by local people in the Izhemskii district.2 It does 
not help that according to Russian law, local people have 
few chances to participate in decision-making concern-
ing their environment (Britcyna et al. forthcoming).
In fact, local people feel they have no voice in envi-
ronmental matters3. For example, oil companies and 
the authorities have concealed information on oil spills 
and the only case when Russian legislation guarantees 
the local people the right to be heard before permission 
to drill oil is given is when an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) is being organized. In practice, cur-
rently EIAs are conducted only for a small number of 
large projects and typically the information relating 
to new projects arrives after decisions concerning the 
project have already been made. Oil exploration work, 
for example, does not require an EIA. As a consequence, 
unexpected exploration near villages has given rise to 
conflicts between locals and oil companies when locals 
were not informed about the forthcoming exploration 
work beforehand. So far Lukoil-Komi does not typically 
voluntarily inform local people before launching explor-
atory work (Britcyna et al. forthcoming).
Even the local voluntary public hearings organized 
in connection with an EIA have become scenes of mis-
trust and power struggle instead of constructive dia-
logue. Local people try to “fail” the hearings by declar-
ing them invalid, and the oil company tries to shape 
the result of the public hearings by bringing their own 
employees to them.4
In our interviews, it became clear that above all 
people want a clean environment where they and their 
children can live safely and sustain traditional liveli-
hoods. They do not wish the oil industry to leave the 
area, but they want it to operate in a more responsible 
way. In addition to environmental responsibility, the 
economic support that oil companies give to municipal-
ities and to the region is also considered important and 
even a self-evident part of corporate social responsibility.
In addition to spontaneous local protests, two envi-
ronmental non-governmental organizations “Save 
Pechora Committee”5 and the Komi-Izhemtsis’ “Izva-
1 Activists in focus group discussion, Izhma 22 February 2015.
2 Interviews of activists of Save Pechora Committee and Izvatas 
in Izhma 20 February 2015.
3 ibid.
4 Interview of local activists in Izhma, 20 February 2015.
5 An NGO working in the Basin of the Pechora River (Komi 
Republic) and dealing with environmental and social problems, 
tas”6 have been defending the environment and local 
people for years. They have also been seeking the support 
of international NGOs to raise their voice and deliver 
their case to a  larger audience to strengthen the pres-
sure on the oil industry.
Benefit-Sharing Agreements
The provision of social services by local companies has 
a long tradition in Russia going back to the Soviet era. 
Thus, considering social aspects as a part of CSR is not 
a novel approach for decision-makers in Russian oil com-
panies (Kortelainen & Nysten-Haarala 2009). The focus 
on environmental aspects and public hearings were also 
achievements of the environmental movement in the 
Soviet Union and not new for Russian oil companies 
(Henry 2009), although the role of hearings has been 
diminished in Russian EIA legislation during the 2000s. 
Global demands for CSR practices have, however, now 
placed both the environmental aspects and participa-
tory rights of local people onto the agenda of Russian 
companies’ CSR policies. In Russia this has been most 
evident in the forest sector, where international forest 
certification schemes have significantly affected Rus-
sian forestry (e.g. Tysiachniouk 2012). Also Russian oil 
companies have faced these global demands when they, 
for example, have borrowed money from international 
financial corporations.
Lukoil-Komi has partly adapted to these global 
developments and now publishes sustainability reports 
in Russian and English and is committed to several 
environmental and social standards, as for instance, to 
the environmental management system ISO 14001 and 
the UN Global Compact principles (Lukoil 2017). It, 
however, does not seem that these standards are actively 
being implemented on the ground (Henry et al 2016).
Lukoil-Komi concludes benefit sharing agreements 
normally at two levels. The first level comprises the agree-
ments between the company and the government of the 
Komi Republic. These agreements are signed every four 
years and aimed at the development of the region. The 
second level includes the agreements with municipal-
ities. Municipalities gather information from the com-
munities about the most pressing issues and give this 
information to Lukoil-Komi. The company considers 
the preliminary plan and sends it to the Lukoil main 
headquarters, where the final decision about financial 
support is made.7
<http://savepechora.ru>
6 An NGO that advocates for the rights of the Izhma Komi.
7 Interview of Lukoil manager in Moscow, April 2015; Interview 
with municipal representative in Izhma February 2015.
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For example, in 2017, Lukoil-Komi concluded agree-
ments with seven municipal units, including Izhemskii 
district. According to the agreement, Lukoil-Komi pro-
vides 25 million rubles (about 380,000 euros) to Izhems-
kii district for such things as the renovation of a sports 
hall, a museum and a hospital canteen and purchase of 
a first aid vehicle for the hospital and a bus for the chil-
dren’s activity center.8
The decision-making leaves very little room for the 
local people to express their opinion on the content of the 
CSR policies. The company negotiates with regional and 
municipal leaders, who sign the contracts. Democratic 
decision-making on the development of the infrastruc-
ture in the municipal organs does not play a decisive 
role, but the choices are handed over to the oil com-
panies as the financers of the development. During our 
field trips, we have observed that the stakeholder dia-
logue has not been efficient. Also, the agreements are 
not freely available. Some interviewees complain that 
they have not received information about how the finan-
cial support from Lukoil-Komi is going to be used. In 
addition to the lack of transparency, these agreements 
do not seem to include any provisions concerning envi-
ronmental issues or compensations for environmental 
damages. Sufficient information on the amount of oil 
spills and replaced pipelines in the Komi Republic is 
not currently available.
However, in April 2015, Lukoil-Komi concluded 
an agreement for a period of one year with Izvatas, the 
association of the Komi-Izhemtsi.9 In this agreement, for 
the first time in Komi, environmental problems were 
at the top of the agenda. For example, the company 
agreed to consult with the Izvatas before starting any 
new operations in the area and to publish timely infor-
mation about oil leaks.10
By entering the agreement, the oil company aimed 
to improve its stakeholder relations by including provi-
sions about environmental issues and by publishing the 
monetary value of the agreements online. The company, 
as well as the Chairman of the Izvatas consider this ben-
efit-sharing agreement as a step forward for taking into 
consideration the interests of the local community that 
is suffering from the ecological situation.11 However, 
the reason to enter this agreement, according to other 
8 “A new agreement is signed between Lukoil-Komi and Izhems-
kii district,” accessed 27.01.2017 <http://www.izhma.ru/ru/
news/1704/>
9 “From ‘cold war’ to a dialog: the transformation of the relations 
of oil industry workers and Izhma Komi,” accessed February 12, 
2017, <http://finugor.ru/node/48453>
10 “Meaningful dialog between Komi-Izhemtsi and Lukoil,” 
accessed November 12, 2016, <http://finugor.ru/kv/node/48595>
11 Ibid.
activists,12 was obviously to silence the loud demands 
of the local protest movement, which were beginning 
to have a negative impact on the reputation of the com-
pany. Incorporating promises to be heard in a traditional 
benefit-sharing agreement can thus be seen in the light 
of this background.
Conclusions
The tensions between the extractive industrial operators 
and the local communities living in the areas where the 
extraction activities take place never go away. Benefit-
sharing agreements between the company and munic-
ipal and regional leaders have traditionally been the 
only tools in building acceptance among local residents 
for the operations of the oil companies. This system is 
a paternalistic way of practicing CSR and does not sup-
port local democratic decision-making; in some cases, 
it even conceals corruption. Such agreements can also 
be seen as a way to buy off the locals with social ben-
efits in exchange for them accepting environmental deg-
radation.13 Both the making and the content of these 
agreements conflict with how both locals and other 
observers typically view CSR. Even if Russian EIA leg-
islation and its current implementation does not actively 
support it, we recommend increasing transparency, par-
ticipation, and environmental responsibility in benefit 
sharing agreements and other oil company policies. By 
diminishing conflicts in this area, such practices—if 
also implemented for the benefit of the environment—
may serve as a positive example for future oil company 
benefit sharing agreements.
We conclude that, based on our research, oil com-
panies should proceed to publish the signed agreements. 
Additionally, in the process of negotiations, oil com-
panies should consider a wider range of stakeholder dia-
logue, by looking beyond the municipal leaders and 
listening to the social and environmental concerns of 
local people as well. However, environmental legislation 
should be developed to include exhaustive participatory 
rights and implemented on the ground with an eye to 
guaranteeing that every citizen can exercise his or her 
equal participatory rights, and thereby develop trust in 
formal institutions and enhance democracy.
For information about the authors, references and acknowl-
edgement see overleaf.
12 Interview of activist of Save Pechora Committee, January 2016.
13 The same mechanism is described in Linda Cook’s Soviet Social 
Contract (Cook 1993).
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Global Standards and Benefit Sharing among Russian and Transnational 
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Abstract
This article compares benefit sharing arrangements set up between indigenous people and Russian and trans-
national oil companies. It demonstrates that Russian oil companies interact with indigenous communities 
in a paternalistic way, while transnational consortiums, operated by Sakhalin Energy and Exxon Neftegaz 
Limited, use the partnership mode of benefit sharing. Typically, both kinds of firms set up tripartite part-
nerships involving companies, indigenous peoples and the state. The paternalistic model of benefit sharing 
overall provides few opportunities for indigenous peoples to participate in the distribution of funds, and 
thereby offers little procedural equity. In terms of distributional equity, it is hard to compare Russian com-
panies with their transnational counterparts as the different companies cover different aspects of indigenous 
peoples’ well being. Russian companies are involved mostly in building social infrastructure, while transna-
tional firms support indigenous entrepreneurship and the revitalization of indigenous subsistence lifestyle, 
languages and cultures.
A Variety of Practices
Russian and international oil companies work on Sak-
halin using a variety of instruments for coordinating 
with indigenous peoples. Currently there are two basic 
models for distributing benefits among the oil com-
panies, native residents, and authorities: paternalistic 
and partnership [Tysiachniouk 2016].
For the paternalist model, a hierarchical form of rela-
tions is typical with the presence of a patron and var-
ious clients. The patron clearly dominates the process 
of decision making. The remaining groups try to secure 
what they can. This system is based on informal prac-
tices and the process of adopting decisions is not trans-
parent. The role of the patron can be played by either 
the authorities or the oil company. Local communities 
in these cases typically have minimal opportunities to 
participate in the decision-making process.
In contrast, the partnership model of management 
offers equal opportunities for participating in dialogue 
and adopting decisions to the indigenous peoples, com-
panies, and state institutions. Global standards play 
an  important role because they determine the rules 
of interaction among the companies and local com-
munities. Various international organizations, such 
as banks, non-governmental organizations, and inter-
governmental organizations serve as guarantors for the 
rights of all players.
For this project, we analyzed which factors allow 
for the formation of the various models of distributing 
resources in the conditions of one or another region 
on the basis of the relationship between companies 
and indigenous peoples on Sakhalin. We will assess 
both modes in terms of procedural (participatory) and 
distributional equity in benefit sharing arrangements 
(McDermott et al. 2013) [see article by M. Tysiach-
niouk for definitions in this RAD issue].
The research was conducted in 2013 and 2015 and 
was based on a  qualitative methodology, including 
interviews, document analysis, and observation. Inter-
views were conducted with company representatives, 
oblast and local public officials, indigenous residents, 
and NGO experts. A total of 60 interviews were con-
ducted. We also examined federal and regional legisla-
tion addressing indigenous peoples, as well as corpo-
rate standards and reports concerning these issues. The 
research also incorporated observations of training sem-
inars on the rights of indigenous peoples during the 
period when the researchers lived on Sakhalin.
Cooperation Among Companies and Local 
Societies
Three large oil and gas companies currently are work-
ing on Sakhalin Island:
• Sakhalin Energy, the operator of the Sakhalin-2 
consortium,
• Exxon Neftegaz Limited, a  subsidiary of Exxon-
Mobil, which is the operator of the Sakhalin-1 con-
sortium, and
• Sakhalin Morneftegaz, a Rosneft subsidiary.
The paternalistic model is represented on Sakhalin by 
Rosneft, which has worked there since the 1960s. This 
company built much of the social infrastructure on the 
island. Generally, the company supports projects con-
nected to the development of culture, sport and educa-
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tion. Decisions about social investments are made by the 
leadership of the company based on the results of dis-
cussions with representatives of the regional and raion 
authorities. According to one local official, “Well, with 
the Russian companies it was somehow always easier 
for us to cooperate—using telephone calls and meet-
ings. We also work with other oil companies, but we 
write them official letters and there are no phone calls 
based on trust.”1
Rosneft does not have a  regular monitoring sys-
tem for tracking public opinion and the desires of the 
local population. During the time when the company 
was building its industrial sites, it achieved these ends 
through public hearings and procedures for evaluat-
ing the impact on the natural environment required by 
legislation. Therefore, there is little participatory equity 
in the paternalistic mode of benefit sharing, while dis-
tributional equity may be sufficient since the oil com-
panies are contributing to valuable social infrastructure.
The second model—partnership—is represented by 
the relations with the population adopted by the com-
panies operating the Sakhalin-2 and Sakhalin-1 inter-
national consortiums: Sakhalin Energy and Exxon Nef-
tegaz Limited. This model appeared on Sakhalin in the 
middle of the 2000s. The starting point was in 2005–
6, when the indigenous peoples began to protest the 
oil and gas companies. The people were unhappy that 
the companies did not take their interests into account 
in launching industrial operations. The actions of the 
indigenous groups had the support of the local NGO 
Sakhalin Environmental Watch and also 146 NGOs 
operating in 22 countries, notably, the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network, 
BANKTrack, and Friends of the Earth, as well as 80 Rus-
sian NGOs located all over Russia, which had been pres-
suring international financial institutions about green 
issues (Lee, 2005).
The groups placed the most pressure on Sakhalin 
Energy, because it had borrowed money from interna-
tional banks. According to the standards of the inter-
national financial institutions, the company must take 
the interests of the local communities into account and 
resolve any emerging conflicts during the construction 
process. Sakhalin Energy developed a “Sakhalin Indige-
nous Minorities Development Plan.” The goal of the plan 
was to strengthen the image of the company as a socially 
responsible concern, establishing partnership relations 
with the indigenous peoples and supporting their sus-
tainable development.
1 Interview with a  representative of the Okha local administra-
tion, August 2015.
As one representative of the company explained, “At 
that time it was even hard to explain to people what the 
word ‘partnership’ means. It means that we are going to 
join with you, you have your resources, we have ours, we 
will unite them and work together for the same goals. At 
that time, many considered that the company was rich 
and that it could give, that it should give, and the others 
would simply take. In fact, the situation was different. 
Everyone has resources. The most important thing is to 
understand what these resources are.”2
At the base of this model of cooperation with the 
local population lay the international standards of the 
UN and the World Bank. Also influential were the cor-
porate standards of international corporations, which 
were shareholders in the Sakhalin-2 project, such as 
Shell. In practice, the company operationalized Prin-
ciple #7, free prior and informed consent from the UN 
declaration on the defense of indigenous peoples. The 
principle of informed consent assumed the participation 
of representatives of the indigenous peoples in the deci-
sion-making process as it affected the area where they 
lived. In this case, the company applied the principle 
in distributing corporate funds for social projects and 
recruiting representatives of the indigenous peoples to 
participate in the decision-making process.
The main partner for developing and realizing this 
plan was the Regional Council of Authorized Repre-
sentatives of the Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin. Also 
involved in developing the plan were the Sakhalin Oblast 
authorities and experts. They set up a management struc-
ture, which included an advisory board, executive com-
mittee, and two program committees. The commit-
tees focused on two basic issues: social programs and 
supporting traditional resource use. The first direction 
focused on financing health, culture, and education 
projects. The second was connected with providing 
financial support to indigenous family enterprises and 
giving them the opportunity to buy necessary equip-
ment, such as motors, machine tools, boats, and other 
equipment. Representatives of the company and the 
authorities cooperated in managing the plan. But the 
main management role was played by representatives of 
the indigenous people. On one hand, the opportunity 
for local residents to determine the priorities in distrib-
uting the funds for social projects made it possible to 
include the local residents in discussing issues that were 
important to them, let them initiate local projects and 
initiatives, and made sure that their interests and needs 
were taken into account. On the other hand, the chance 
to influence the distribution of these funds led to inter-
nal conflicts among the local communities. The sup-
2 Sakhalin Energy employee, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, August 2015.
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port efforts were realized in all parts of Sakhalin, even 
in areas that were not physically near the activities of 
the company. Twice a year international experts evalu-
ated the implementation of the plan.
Exxon Neftegaz Limited developed a  somewhat 
different system for distributing funds. Like Sakhalin 
Energy, Exxon set up a  trilateral agreement with rep-
resentatives of the oblast authorities and the indige-
nous peoples as well as a consultative committee. The 
company makes the main decisions on distributing the 
funds for social projects, but there are collegial discus-
sions of the possible projects. Three representatives of 
the company, a representative of the Sakhalin Oblast 
government, and three members of the regional coun-
cil take part in these discussions. Exxon’s zone of sup-
port for social programs for the indigenous peoples is 
smaller than the area that Sakhalin Energy addresses. 
Exxon supports only those raions in which it is actively 
working (Nogliki and Okha). Exxon spends its money 
on education, culture, and healthcare. It does not pro-
vide grants to support traditional economic activities by 
family entrepreneurs.
Overall, Sakhalin Energy supports more general 
social programs than Exxon Neftegaz Limited. This 
strategy reflects Sakhalin Energy’s greater dependence 
on international creditors. As a result of these ties, Sak-
halin Energy generates greater procedural and distribu-
tional equity then Exxon Oil and Gas Limited.
Conclusion
Our research allows us to define the basic components 
of the two models. The paternalistic model is repre-
sented in the activities of Rosneft–Sakhalin Mornefte-
gaz and is characterized by the following features. First, 
the company conducts the main relationship for address-
ing questions related to the development of industrial 
projects, social investments, and the resolution of eco-
logical problems with representatives of the authorities. 
Local residents practically do not participate in discuss-
ing the activity of the company as it affects their imme-
diate environment. Representatives of the community 
who are concerned about the impacts of the company 
on the environment do not have the opportunity to 
complain directly to the company. Instead, they work 
with the NGO Sakhalin Environmental Watch, which 
plays the role of a social monitoring agency on Sakhalin.
Second, there are no clear and transparent procedures 
for decision-making in relation to the development and 
implementation of social programs. A significant part of 
the decisions are adopted as a result of semi-formal nego-
tiations with representatives of the authorities.
Third, priority in the implementation of social pro-
grams goes to the construction or repair of buildings 
designated for public uses, such as sports facilities and 
schools, and conducting sports and cultural events.
Fourth, the company has few special programs 
oriented toward indigenous people. Finally, there is no 
regular system of monitoring and outreach to the pop-
ulation about the activities of the company.
By contrast, the partnership model, employed by 
Sakhalin Energy and Exxon Neftegaz Limited has the 
following characteristics. First is the participation of 
the indigenous residents in the distribution of funds 
for social projects of the companies working on Sak-
halin. Sakhalin Energy had fully delegated to repre-
sentatives of the indigenous people the right to choose 
which social projects get implemented. Exxon Nefte-
gaz Limited gave the representatives of the local com-
munities an advisory vote. In both companies, they 
use a transparent and formalized procedure for adopt-
ing decisions. The distribution of grants is conducted 
with well-defined and transparent rules and the results 
are announced to all residents. Independent interna-
tional experts carry out consistent monitoring of the 
awarded grants.
Second, there is regular cooperation with the local 
residents on the social and ecological aspects of the com-
panies’ activities. Both companies actively inform the 
population about their extraction efforts and monitor 
the mood of the population. This outreach is carried out 
by corporate information centers, during annual meet-
ings with the population, by a system of seeking com-
plaints from the population, and a network of coordi-
nators closely connected with the local communities. In 
situations when local residents are concerned about the 
impact of the company activities on their environment, 
the firms organize additional research in which the res-
idents themselves can participate. Thus, in addressing 
the question of whether the seismic exploration activ-
ities have had an impact on the behavior of nearby fish 
stocks, indigenous representatives served as observers 
during exploration works of the company.
Third, the companies’ social programs work to sup-
port local initiatives rather than providing generic social 
infrastructure buildings. The companies try to stimulate 
the local residents to realize their own projects. Exam-
ples include grants which the companies have made to 
support dog breeding, purchasing processing equipment, 
and the revival of national languages.
Finally, the realization of the partnership model 
includes a large number of trainings and seminars for 
local residents aimed at helping them to develop their 
own initiatives. The main goal of these seminars is to 
teach residents to develop partnership relations with 
companies, take the initiative, and to dream up and 
implement their own projects.
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However, these beneficial practices do not guarantee 
that the partnership model automatically improves the 
territory’s social development. In several cases there have 
been unanticipated consequences from the implemen-
tation of these strategies. For example, when Sakhalin 
Energy delegated the ability to distribute grants among 
entrepreneurs to indigenous representatives, there was 
conflict within the indigenous community over who 
was most deserving of the funds.
Another example is the question of the extent to 
which the implementation of such corporate social pro-
grams is effective. The partnership model gives preference 
to expanding local initiatives and encouraging entrepre-
neurship among the local population. Such programs 
are considered preferable because they are less likely to 
contribute to the emergence of attitudes of dependency 
among local residents or push people to organize them-
selves. At the same time, not all training programs seek-
ing to develop local initiatives turn out to be effective. In 
several cases, corporate funds invested in the construc-
tion of social infrastructure turned out to be a more reli-
able investment strategy. Therefore, it is hard to compare 
distributional equity in benefit sharing arrangements 
between Russian and transnational companies.
According to the results of our research, we can 
identify several key factors affecting the formation of 
either partner or paternalistic models of cooperation 
with indigenous peoples. First is the level of influence 
of international investors and standards. The higher 
the company’s dependence on international financial 
institutions, the more likely it is oriented toward inter-
national standards protecting the rights of indigenous 
peoples. Therefore, many multinational corporations 
seek to create special programs for indigenous peoples, 
demonstrating in this way their attention to interna-
tional rules. In implementing the international stand-
ards at the local level, the companies themselves expe-
rience changes. Thus, the principle of free prior and 
informed consent from the UN Declaration of the rights 
for indigenous peoples requires discussion and agree-
ment with representatives of the indigenous people about 
all extraction activities which affects their lives. At the 
same time, Sakhalin Energy narrowed the sphere of 
work for this principle and connected it only with the 
participation of indigenous peoples in the distribution 
of corporate funds for social projects.
The second important factor in the formation of 
partnership relations is the level of dependence on the 
state authorities. As a rule, Russian companies are more 
dependent on the Russian authorities than the interna-
tional companies. This level of dependence affects the 
strategies which the companies choose in realizing their 
social programs in the regions. The Russian companies 
prefer to follow the demands or desires of the regional 
authorities, while the international companies coop-
erate directly with the population. In part, this situ-
ation reflects the Soviet tradition under which industrial 
companies were dependent on state policy and also the 
more recent experience in the 1990s when businesses 
typically resolved their problems through informal ties 
to the authorities. Following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the construction of new businesses in the 
1990s, business people typically came to believe that 
the key factor of success for companies was good rela-
tions with the authorities.
The third factor is the readiness of the population 
to take the initiative with its own projects and defend 
its positions. The efforts of the indigenous people on 
Sakhalin in 2005 forced Sakhalin Energy and Exxon 
Neftegaz Limited to develop new, more effective instru-
ments of cooperation. These included the creation of 
the Regional Council of Authorized Representatives of 
the Indigenous Peoples of Sakhalin, which took on the 
basic function of a mediator of relations between the 
indigenous peoples and the oil and gas companies. In 
each case, the developed and mutually formalized rules 
were adapted to the local context and led to the creation 
of specific practices for distributing benefits.
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